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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

ABSTRACTS
Administrative Law-Application of Res Judicata in Administrative
Proceedings
The director of financial institutions of Illinois rejected D's
application to organize a savings and loan association. The rejection order was affirmed by the circuit court. D reapplied to the
director and, based on new evidence, the application was approved.
The circuit court affirmed and the Ps, thirteen savings and loan
associations, appealed. Held, affirmed. A prior decision of the
director denying application to organize a savings and loan association is not res judicata on issues raised by the second application.
Citizens Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Knight, 219 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App.
1966).
The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to administrative
determinations has been the basis of some controversy. The traditional view is that the doctrine is completely inapplicable.'
Generally, however, in more modem times the courts have found
the doctrine of res judicata applicable to some administrative proceedings, partially applicable to some, and inapplicable to others.'
Under this more recent view the applicability of the doctrine
depends upon the nature of the administrative tribunal involved,
generally being applied where the function of the administrative
agency is judicial in nature.'
Viewed from this angle, res judicata applies only to a small area
in the field of administrative law.4 It is readily applied to past
facts, modified and partially applied to issues of law or policy
involving continuing practices, and not applied at all to nonjudicial
administrative action.' Some administrative agencies are nonjudicial in nature and the cases of such agencies reviewed by the
courts following the traditional view in most situations will reach
the same result that the courts following the modem view would
have reached. In the areas of a continuing course of conduct the
'Waterbury Say. Bank. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 29 A. 2d 455 (1941).
§ 18.12 (1958).
3 People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 268 P.2d 723 (1954).
4 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 496 (1962).
22 DAvIS, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

5 2 DAVIs, ADMN'ISTRATrvE LAw TREATSiE

§ 18.12 (1958).
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courts following the traditional view recognize so many exceptions
that here too the outcome is generally the same.
It is often difficult to determine the function of an administrative
body. Since most proceedings apply to areas of a continuing course
of conduct the problem is often one of partial application of the
doctrine. One writer views the problem as a question of "whether
an administrative agency should be permitted to change or amend
its prior order, where to do so would affect the rights or privileges
of one who was a party to the proceedings in which the prior order
was entered." 6 The answer in any given case would depend upon a
balancing of the public or private interests involved.7
The question of whether the doctrine of res judicata will apply
to administrative proceedings has never been directly answered
by the West Virginia Supreme Court. The question was posed but
not answered in Pritt v. West Virginia No. R. R.8 However, the
court, in an earlier case, indicated that the doctrine is applicable
in some situations." In this earlier case the court, by dictum,
declared that, if the Public Service Commission found an existing
rate to be reasonable, the Commission would be bound by the
previously established rate and could not change it.
The reason for adapting the doctrine of res judicata to the courts
was to prevent litigation by the same parties of the same claims or
issues."° This same reason exists where the function of the administrative agency is judicial in nature or at times involves areas of
a continuing course of conduct." If an administrative tribunal is to
be effective in these areas, invocation and application of the
doctrine of res judicata are the logical responses to reason.

506 (1965).
7Ibid.
8 132W. Va. 184, 204, 51 S.E.2d 105, 117 (1948).
9
Anchor Coal Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 123 W. Va. 439, 450,
15 S.E.2d 406, 411 (1941).
10 Btrmu, PLEADiNG AND PRAcTICE § 357 (4th ed. 1952).
6 2 CoopEn, STATE Aro-mnmusmrxvE LAw

11CoopER,

ADmumTsAmx

AENcEms AND

THE CouRTs

241 (1951); 2

AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 497 (1962).
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Constitutional Law--State Regulation of Legal
Profession-Solicitation
The State Bar Association of Virginia obtained an injunction
against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a railroad labor
union, enjoining the alleged solicitation of legal business and unauthorized practice of law. The United States Supreme Court
remanded the case, holding that the union should be able to advise
injured workers and recommend specific attorneys. On remand, the
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond enjoined the union from
soliciting business but permitted its recommendation of attorneys.
Held, injunction vacated. Under the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court a distinction could not be made between solicitation
and recommendation. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,149 S.E.2d 265 (Va. 1966).
This is the latest development in a situation which has caused
much concern to the legal profession. Traditionally the regulation
of the legal profession has been a function of the state.' While
recognizing this the Supreme Court has held that in regulating the
practice of law a state cannot ignore the constitutional rights of
individuals.2
The actual holding of the United States Supreme Court in this
case was that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
right of the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and
carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain
legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers."3 A strict
reading of this holding leads one to believe that the decree of the
Chancery Court allowing the union to recommend attorneys but
not to solicit for them was a valid distinction. This narrow interpretation is also supported somewhat by the finding of the majority
of the Supreme Court of the United States that no solicitation
occured, either by the union or the lawyers, as a result of the
union's practice of recommending competent lawyers.'

' Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

2

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1984);

NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
34 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
Id. at 6-7.
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However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia chose to give
the mandate of the Supreme Court a broad interpretation and
rejected the distinction drawn by the Chancery Court. They stated
that the Supreme Court of the United States held that the activities
of the union were constitutionally protected and that it did not
matter if the activity was characterized as solicitation under Virginia
law. Consequently, they could not draw a line between solicitation
and recommendation in the case.
On the other hand, the Virginia Court observed that nothing in
the Supreme Court mandate prevented the state from applying the
Virginia laws and Canons in disciplinary or injunctive proceedings
against any lawyers approved by the union who may have solicited
or joined in the authorized solicitation of legal employment. This
was their view despite Mr. Justice Black's dictum that a lawyer
accepting employment under this plan would have the same protection as the union.' The Virginia position was also taken by the
American Bar Association.6
The potential for evil in the Supreme Court decision was pointed
out in the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark.7 He noted that it would
encourage further departures from the high standards set by Canons
of Ethics as well as work to the disadvantage of the union by subjecting the approved attornys to the control of one man. Some have
viewed it as a challenge to the legal profession to change with the
times and to meet the demand for legal services where it exists. 9
It remains for the Supreme Court to decide how far "solicitation"
will be authorized and at what point it will become "a conmercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and
ethical fabric of the administration of justice.:

5
Brotherhood of Railroad
6 69 Com. LJ. 326.
7 Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).

Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1,. 12 (1964).
851 VA. L. REv. 1693 (1965); Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14 Crvm.-MAn. L. REv. 1 (1965); 40 NOmE DAsm LAw.
477 (1965).
9Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services In Perspective, 12 U.C.LA.
L. REv. 279; Note, 79 Hnv. L. REv. 416 (1965); 67 W. VA. L. REv. 66

(1964).

'°Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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Procedure-Granting Dismissal or Directed Verdict after the
Opening Statements
Ps brought a personal injury action against the Ds to recover for
personal injuries, property damages, and medical expenses. D1
asserted a counterclaim against the Ps for medical expenses and
property damage and a cross-claim against D2 . After the opening
statements to the jury in behalf of the Ps and D1, the trial court
upon motion "dismissed" D2 from the action and also "dismissed",
on its merits, the cross-claim of D1. Held, affirmed. Upon motion
the trial court may take a case from the jury and grant a directed
verdict or a dismissal when the opening statements combined with
the pre-trial stipulation clearly establish that the opposing party
has no right to recover. Alexander v. Jennings, 149 S.E.2d 213
(W. Va. 1966).
Although the power of the trial court to enter a dismissal or
direct a verdict after the opening statement presents a case of first
impression in West Virginia, the principle is a well established
one.' The United States Supreme Court stated in Best v. District
of Columbia2 that undoubtedly the federal courts had such power.
However, despite the indisputable power to do so, federal courts
have been reluctant to grant such a motion at that stage of the
trial proceeding.' One court reasoned that since the opening statement could be waived, it would be difficult to give an opening
statement that would so dilute the cause of action stated in
the complaint as to justify granting a directed verdict.The language in the Alexander case seems to indicate a reluctance
on the part of the West Virginia court to grant such motions. In
the opinion the court stated that such authority "should be exercised
cautiously and only in a clear case." Thus, although the power of
the trial court to take such action has been confirmed in West Virginia, it is doubtful that this principle will be given a very liberal
application.
Jerry David Hogg
'See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1411 (1966).
2291 U.S. 411 (1934).
3 Lampka v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 325 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Hurley, 49 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1931).
4 Lampka v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 325 F.2d 628 (D.C.Cir. 1963).
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